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THE SCHOOL VOUCHER DEBATE AFTER
ZELIVIAN: CAN STATES BE COMPELLED TO
FUND SECTARIAN SCHOOLS UNDER THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION?
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court in al man v. Simmous-Hanis held in
June 2002 that a state does not violate the Establishment Clause by pro-
viding funding to a religiously affiliated school if the program meets
certain criteria outlined in that opinion. One of the questions that re-
mains after &Nan, however, is whether a state, once it has initiated some
form of tuition voucher program that includes non-sectarian private
schools, can be compelled under the federal Constitution to include
sectarian schools in its program. This Note analyzes this question under
two lines of U.S. Supreme Court precedent—the limited public forum
cases and the government-as-speaker cases—and concludes that Zebnan
does not require a state to include religiously affiliated schools in its
school voucher program. This Note then applies this reasoning to the
Maine school voucher program that is currently the focus of two lawsuits,
and concludes that the Maine program, which excludes sectarian schools,
does not violate the federal Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in June 2002 in Zelman
v. Simmons-Hargis, the primary issue in the school voucher debate fo-
cused on whether a state or municipality would violate the federal Es-
tablishment Clause by providing funding to a religiously affiliated
school.' In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that Ohio's school voucher
program did not violate the Establishment Clause. 2 The program was
neutral, the Court held, with respect to religion, and "provide [d] as-
sistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, directfedi
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choice."3
 Although hailed as a
landmark victory for school voucher proponents, many scholars be-
lieve that this was only the beginning of the legal challenges facing
I See U.S. CoNs•. amend. I.; 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002).
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school voucher programs that provide government funding for tui-
tion at sectarian schools.4
The term "school voucher" includes a broad range of govern-
ment aid programs.5
 One can raise a variety of legal challenges to
school voucher programs on both the state and federal levels.° The
most widely discussed state challenges involve individual state consti-
tutional provisions that require a more stringent separation of church
and state than the federal Establishment Clause.? School voucher
proponents can also raise federal claims under the Free Exercise and
4 See, e.g., School Vouchers: Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes (The Pew Forum on Re-
ligion and Public Life, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2002, at 4 [hereinafter Pew Forum) (stat-
ing that in opening the Establishment Clause door for vouchers, Zelman also invites a new
set of constitutional questions).
5 Seep! jasperson, Renaissance in Education: The Constitutionality and Viability of an Edu-
cational Choice or timcher System, 1993 PAU Enuc. & L.J. 126, 126 (1993); Martha M.
McCarthy, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: A Victory for School Vouchers, 171 Enuc. L. REP. 1, 1
(2003).
6 See, e.g., Pew Forum, supra note 4, at 8-12.
7 In School Vouchers: Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes, a group of leading constitu-
tional law professors issued a joint statement providing an overview of the next rounds of
constitutional debate in the wake of 7..eltnan. See Pew Forum, supra note 4, at 8-12. The
statement finds that the first set of issues includes state constitutional restrictions on
vouchers. See id. at 8. The statement describes how more than two-thirds of the states have
constitutional provisions that restrict aid to religious organizations more explicitly than
does the Establishment Clause. See id. These state restrictions vary in their language and
will generate their own distinct set of textual, historical, and precedent-based arguments.
See id. These scholars find it helpful to group these state provisions into three categories:
provisions that say government funds may not be used for any private school or that all
schools supported by public funds must be under the exclusive control of public authori-
ties (thereby excluding secular as well as religious private schools); provisions that prohibit
the expenditure of public funds in aid of, or to support or benefit, any sectarian school
controlled by a religious organization (thereby restricting aid to religious, but not to secu-
lar, private schools); and provisions that forbid the compelled support of religious worship
or instruction, or that forbid state money to be appropriated for or applied to religious
worship or instruction (which may permit aid to religious schools as long as the aid could
be segregated from aid used for religious teaching). See id. at 8-9. For further elaboration
of some of the issues presented in the Pew Forum statement, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Zelman 's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Bat-
tles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 917-94 (2003).
For additional reading on state challenges to school choice programs, see, for exam-
ple, JoscPit P. ViTtatirri, CHOOSING EquAurrie 168-78 (1999); Mark Edward DeForrest, An
Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Con-
cerns, 26 HARv.J.L. & Pus. PoCv 551, 551-626 (2003); Richard W. Garnett, Brown 's Prom-
ise, Blaine's Legacy, 17 CONST. CommENT. 651, 670-74 (2000); Toby]. Heytens, School Choice
and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 125-34 (2000); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake:
School Choice, The First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. PUB. Poify
657, 661-80 (1998).
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Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.°
In addition to the legal battles over school choice legislation,
there are a large number of policy considerations for and against
vottchers.9 These heated policy issues create vigorous debate over
vouchers, and often blur the line between constitutionality and social
concerns. 10 There is also a well-documented anti-Catholic motivation
for the enactment of many of the more restrictive state constitutions,
which further adds to the controversy surrounding school vouchers."
The field of school vouchers is vast, with countless areas to ex-
plore and debate. 12 This Note, however, focuses on the question of
whether a state, once it has initiated some form of tuition voucher
program that includes non-sectarian private schools, can be com-
pelled under the federal Constitution to include sectarian schools in
such a program. This Note uses the Maine "tuitioning" program as an
example for analysis." Part I provides an introduction to school
vouchers and the policy issues surrounding the voucher debate." Part
II provides a brief summary of the requirements outlined in Zelman
for a school choice program to be valid under the Establishment
Clause) Part. III reviews the major U.S. Supreme Court free exercise
cases, 16 and Part IV reviews the major U.S. Supreme Court free speech
cases, each in order to provide a background for future voucher litiga-
a Sec, e.g„ Garnett, supra note 7, at 666-69; Viteritti, supra note 7, at 699-703; Eugene
Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 Ntyrst. DAME J,L, EMI ICS & Pus. Pot' Y 341,
365-73 (1999). In addition, the Pew Forum statement discusses two lines of federal chal-
lenges if a state enacts a voucher program and excludes religious schools from participa-
tion. See Pew Forum, supra note 4, at 9-10. The first argument is that the exclusion of relig-
ious schools from a voucher program discriminates against religion and so violates the
Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause (as a form of viewpoint discrimination
against religion), and/or the Equal Protection Clause. See id. The second argument is that
many of the state anti-aid provisions are constitutionally tainted because their enactment
was substantially motivated by nineteenth century Protestant hostility toward the growing
Catholic population and Catholic school system. See id. at 9.
9 See generally VITERri -n, supra note 7, at 1-22,180-208; Nicole Stelle Garnett & Rich-
ard W. Garnett, School Choice, The First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEE. REV. L. & Pot..
301,341-61 (2000); Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education,
Religious Reform, and the Common Good, 23 CAsnozo L. Rix. 1281,1303-12 (2002).
10 See Virurn't, supra note 7, at 1-22, 180-208; Garnett & Garnett, supra note 9, at
341-61; Garnett, supra note 9, at 1303-12.
See VEEEREEEI, supra note 7, at 1-22, 180-208; Garnett & Garnett, supra note 9, at
341-61; Garnett, supra note 9, at 1303-12.
12
 See, e.g., VITEREETI, supra note 7; Pew Forum, supra note 4.
13 See infra notes 174-193 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 74-107 and accompanying text.
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don." Part V introduces the school choice program currently being
challenged by two lawsuits in Maine. 18
 This Part provides an overview
and history of the tuitioning program in Maine as well as a discussion
of two unsuccessful challenges to the Maine program.0 Part VI at-
tempts to analyze the Maine program under the free exercise reason-
ing discussed in Part III and the free speech reasoning discussed in
Part IV, and predicts that the Maine program can survive federal con-
stitutional scrutiny under each of these challenges."
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND POLICY OF SCHOOL
VOUCHER LEGISLATION
Although the terms "school choice" and "school voucher" are
often used interchangeably, school choice is a broader term that en-
compasses voucher programs, magnet and charter schools, and tui-
tion tax credits.21 Under a basic school voucher system, eligible fami-
lies receive a designated amount of state aid toward each school-age
child's education at a public or private school of their choice. 22 Such
school voucher programs are traditionally associated with public
schools located in economically depressed communities. 23 Other
voucher programs, like those in Maine and Vermont, provide for stu-
dents residing in towns without public schools to receive public funds
to attend public or non-sectarian private schools located outside of
their district. 24
A. The Policy of School Vouchers
In addition to the legal battles over school choice legislation,
there are a large number of policy considerations for and against
vouchers.25
 Economist Milton Friedman first proposed school vouch-
ers in 1955, promoting educational vouchers as a means of remedying
17
 See infra notes 108-173 and accompanying text.
13 Sec infra notes 174-193 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 174-223 and accompanying text.
20 Sec info-a notes 224-284 and accompanying text.
jasperson, supra note 5, at 126.
22
 McCarthy, supra note 5, at 1.
233 Jason S. Marks, What MO School ibuchers and Church-State Separation After Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 58J. Mo. B. 354, 354 (2002).
24 See Christopher W. Hammons, School Choice Issues in Depth: The Effects of Town Tuition-
lag iii l'ermont and Maine (Milton & Rose D. Friedman Foundation, Indianapolis, IN), Jan.
2001, at 5.
25 See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
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the poor performance of public schools by removing government
control and placing control in the hands of parents. 28
Proponents of school vouchers today have adopted Friedman's
reasoning, and argue that the educational quality of public schools
will increase as a result of vouchers because public schools would be
forced to improve or risk losing students and teachers to private
schools.27 Opponents to school vouchers counter that the benefits of
such competition are insignificant. 28
Proponents of school vouchers also argue that fairness requires
the government to provide an educational alternative for the inner-
city poor who are forced to attend failing public schools. 29 Opponents
contend, however, that empirical evidence reveals that new, for-profit
private schools entering inner-city voucher markets may actually have
worse academic records than "failing" public schools." Moreover,
these opponents argue that the voucher system is actually unfair to
the students who are left behind in the public schools. 3i This is be-
cause evidence shows that voucher programs can result in "cream
skimming" by removing the higher-scoring students to private schools,
driving down average public school test scores.32
Lastly, voucher supporters contend that voucher programs help
close the education gap between black and white Americans." Justice
Thomas explicitly mentioned this benefit of the neutral school
voucher program in his concurring opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris." Opponents, however, argue that because most school
voucher programs only subsidize part of a private education, the
poorest families, who will not be able to make up the difference be-
tween the tuition and the subsidy, will bear the greatest burden."
26 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STA•rEs1F.wt. 158-71 (2d ed. 1990).
27 Brian L. White, Potential Federal and State Constitutional Barriers to the Success of School
Vouchers, 49 U. K. L. REV. 889, 897 (2001).
25 Martin Carnoy, Should States implement Vouchers Even if They Are Constitutional?, in
School Vouchers: Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes (The Pew Forum on Religion and Pub-
lic Life), Aug. 2002, at 28.
2° See White, supra note 27, at 896-97.
3° See Carnoy, supra note 28, at 26.
51 See id, at 30.
52 Id.
23 Paul E. Peterson, A Call for Citywide Voucher Demonstration Programs, in School Vouchers:
Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life), Aug.
2002, at 16.
34 See 536 U.S. 639, 676-77, 681-84 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
55 Sec White, supra note 27, at 899.
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B. A Shady Past: Anti-Catholic Sentiments in Common School Origins
The apprehension about using public monies to fund sectarian
schools has a long history in the United States, and traces back to the
origin of the common schoo1.36 The common school concept was
founded on the pretense that religion has no legitimate place in pub-
lic education." Some scholars contend, however, that the common
school curriculum promoted a kind of religious orthodoxy of its own
that centered on the teachings of mainstream Protestantism." Fur-
thermore, one of the admitted functions of the common school sys-
tem was to serve as an instrument for the acculturation of the growing
immigrant populations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries." These almost entirely Catholic immigrants from Italy and Ire-
land, however, resisted the Protestant teachings of the common
school and founded a large number of sectarian schools in response. 4°
This created tension between the Protestant majority and the mostly
Catholic minority on the issue of education. 41
C. The Blaine Amendment
The Blaine Amendment of 1875, a product of this tension, was
named after congressional representative James G. Blaine of Maine. 42
Blaine agreed to sponsor an amendment to the federal Constitution
that was drafted by Ulysses S. Grant to encourage free schools and re-
solve that not one dollar be appropriated to support any sectarian
schools.43
The proposed Blaine Amendment to the federal Constitution was
accompanied by nativist and anti-Catholic rhetoric." Although the
amendment never passed (it fell merely four votes short of the re-
quired two-thirds majority in the Senate), Blaine's message was incor-
porated into the Republican national party platform against "Rum,
Romanism and Rebellion."45 More important, however, was that many
new territories seeking statehood were required to incorporate Blaine
Amendments into their state constitutions in order to receive con-
36 See Viteritti, supra note 7, at 661-79.
37 Id. at 666.
33 Id.
]9 See id. at 668.
49 Sec id. at 669.
4 ' See Viteritti, supra note 7, at 670-72.
42 See id. at 670-71.
43 Id .
44 See id. at 671.
43 Id. at 672.
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gressional approval." The result is that today, approximately thirty-
eight states have Blaine Amendments in their constitutions, which
prevent state governmental entities from appropriating money to aid
sectarian institutions. 47 In addition, approximately twenty-nine states
have "compelled support" clauses in their constitutions, which say, in
essence, that no one shall be compelled to support a church or relig-
ious ministry without his or her consent." As can be seen by the
numbers, many states have both types of provisions." Only three
states, however, have neither provision in their constitutions: Maine,
Louisiana, and North Carolina. 50
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REQUIREMENTS FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
PROGRAMS AFTLR ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS
The tension surrounding the funding of sectarian schools, as well
as the concern that providing government aid to sectarian schools
may violate the Establishment Clause, was the focus of the June 2002
Supreme Court decision in Zelman. v. Simmons-Harris." The Establish-
ment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."52 In Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion stated that "where a government aid program is neutral
with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad
class of citizens, who, in turn, direct government aid to religious
schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent pri-
vate choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause. "53
The Cleveland, Ohio voucher program at issue in Zelman was cre-
ated after a federal court ordered state supervision of that city's pub-
lic schools." The federal court issued this order because, for more
than a generation, Cleveland's public schools had been among the
worst performing in the nation.55 The Cleveland voucher program
gave qualified families residing in the Cleveland school district the
46 See Viteritti, sttprn note 7, at 672-73.
47 See Oversight Hearing on the Supreme Court's School Choice Decision and Congress' Authority
to Enact Choice Programs Before the House Judiciary Committee on the Constitution, 108th Cong. 9
(testimony of Richard D. Romer of the Institute for Justice), http://www.house.gov/judi-




51 See 536 U.S. 639,639 (2002).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53 536 U.S. at 652.
54 See id. at 644-45.
55 Id. at 644,
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option of sending their children to a participating public school, a
private sectarian school, or a private non-sectarian school. 56
In its analysis, the Court determined that three characteristics
were essential to the Cleveland program's validity under the Estab-
lishment Clause.57
 These elements were neutrality among participat-
ing schools, the award of aid based on neutral, secular criteria, and
individual parental choice in selecting a school. 58 Implicitly, the Court
required that any school voucher program that includes sectarian
schools must contain, at a minimum, some variation of these three
elements. 59
The first element of Cleveland's school voucher program was
neutrality among participating schools and the requirement that
these schools remain neutral in their admissions process. 69 Any pri-
vate school could participate in the program if it were located in the
district and met state educational standards. 61 In addition, participat-
ing private schools had to "agree not to discriminate on the basis of
race, religion, or ethnic background, or to 'advocate or foster unlaw-
ful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of
race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.'" 62
A second element of Cleveland's voucher program was that it
awarded aid "'on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither fa-
vor[ed) nor disfavorlied] religion, and {was] made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.'" 63
Thus, there were "no 'financial incentives' that 'skewed' the program
toward religious schools."64 The Court noted that the Cleveland "pro-
gram, in fact, created] financial disincentives for religious schools." 65
Private schools in the Cleveland program received "only half the gov-
ernment assistance given to community schools and one-third the as-
sistance given to magnet schools." 66 The Court further noted, how-
ever, that such disincentive features were not constitutionally re-
quired. 67
56 Id, at 695.
57 Id. at 645-46.
" &M an, 536 U.S. at 645-46.
59 See id.
66 Id. at 645.
61 See id.
62Id. (quoting 01110 REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A) (6) (Anderson 1999 & Supp.
2000)).
63 Ze[man, 536 U.S. at 653-54 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997)).
64 Id. at 653 (quoting Winters v. Wash. Dept of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-
88 (1986) (alterations removed)).
65 Id. at 654.
55 Id.
67 See id.
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A third element of the Cleveland program was that families who
qualified for a school voucher could exercise trite private choice in
determining where among the participating schools to send their
child. The Court found that "[w]here tuition aid [was] spent de-
pend[ed] solely upon where parents who receive[d] tuition aid
[chose] to enroll their child.'" In conjunction with this third private
choice requirement, the Court also noted that under the Cleveland
program, any check for private school tuition was made payable to the
parent who then endorsed the check over to the school.'" Thus, the
program was held not to violate the Establishment. Clause."
As discussed above, however, the Court's decision in Zelman only
addressed the validity of the Cleveland voucher program under the
Establishment Clause." Voucher programs are still vulnerable to chal-
lenges under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First
Amendment,"
III. FREE EXERCISE AND SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAMS:
A REVIEW OF PRECEDENT
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibit-
ing the free exercise [of religion]."74 To show a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause, an individual must first prove that the offending law
is not neutral and not of general applicability." After this threshold
challenge has been met, a court then determines whether the gov-
ernment has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a cen-
tral religious belief or practice, and, if so, whether a compelling gov-
ernmental interest justifies that burden." Thus, free exercise chal-
lenges typically involve one of three situations: a law burdening an
individual's ability to observe his or her religious practices," a law re-
68 See Zebnatt, 536 U.S. at 645.
69 Id. at 646.
7° See id.
71 Id. at 662-63.
72 See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 74-173 and accompanying text.
74 U.S. CON sT. amend. I.
74
 See Employment Div. v Smith, 494 U.S. 872,879 (1990).
76 Sec Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680,699 (1989). Although there is considerable
disagreement over whether a court should determine what is considered a central relig-
ious belief, courts in practice do consider what qualifies as a protected religious belief
when evaluating free exercise challenges. See generally McCoNNEt.i. ET AL., RELIGION AND
CONSTITUTION 869-905 (2002).
77 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963) (holding restriction on state
unemployment compensation violated Free Exercise Clause because it required individu-
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quiring conduct that is prohibited by an individual's religious be-
liefs,78
 or a law prohibiting conduct that is required by one's relig-
ion.79
A. Employment Division v. Smith: Minimum Requirements for a
Successful Free Exercise Challenge
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court
set out the minimum requirements necessary for a successful free ex-
ercise challenge and held that if a law is neutral and of general appli-
cability, it need not be justified by a compelling governmental inter-
est, even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice.89 In Smith, two members of the Native American
Church were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote for sacramen-
tal purposes. 81
 The two were subsequently denied unemployment
benefits because the use of peyote was a criminal offense under state
law.82
 They claimed that they should not have been denied unem-
ployment benefits because the use of peyote was central to their prac-
tice of religion.85
The Court, however, reasoned that to allow religious exceptions
to criminal laws 'would be to make the professed doctrines of relig-
ious belief superior to the law of the land.'" 84 Thus, the Court held
that to succeed on a free exercise claim, an individual must prove that
the law was not enacted with a neutral purpose and was not of general
applicability.85
B. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah: When a
Facially Neutral Law Is Enacted with Impermissible Intent
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in 1993, expanded on the neutrality requirement
als to make themselves available for work Monday through Saturday, and denied compen-
sation to individuals whose religious observations took place on Saturday).
78 See United States -V. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,258-61 (1982) (holding that Amish employer
was not exempt from social security taxes even though the Amish faith prohibited partici-
pation in governmental support programs).
79 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,546-47
(1993) (striking down ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice as a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause because the law had the purpose of disfavoring a particular religious prac-
tice).
93 See 494 U.S. at 878-79.
91 See id. at 874.
82 Id. at 874-75.
83 Id. at 878.
84 Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,167 (1878)).
95 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
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announced in Smith, and held that a law enacted specifically to target
the practices of one religious group "must undergo the most rigorous
of scrutiny."88 The Court stated that. "[Mt a minimum, the protections
of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates
against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct.
because it is undertaken for religious reasons." 87 In Lukumi, the Court
reviewed several ordinances enacted in the city of Hialeah, Florida
that prohibited animal sacrifices. 88 The Court found that these laws
were enacted to target the Santeria religion, which had opened a
church in the city, and planned to engage in the religious practice of
animal sacrifice. 89
First, the Court found that the animal sacrifice ordinances were
not neutral or of general applicability, as required by Smith." In its
analysis, the Court found guidance in its equal protection jurispru-
dence, noting that evidence relevant to a determination of neutrality
"includes, among other things, the historical background of the [leg-
islation], the specific series of events leading to the enactment or
official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the de-
cisionmaking body." °t In applying this analysis to the facts of the case,
the Court found that the resolutions and ordinances prohibiting ani-
mal sacrifice within the city limits were enacted specifically because
the Hialeah community did not want the Santeria sacrifices taking
place in their midst.92 Furthermore, the Court found that the ordi-
nances were all enacted "in tandem" to target the Santeria church
and their religious practices.93 Thus, the Court determined that "the
ordinances were enacted "because of," not merely "in spite of,"' their
suppression of Santeria religious practice."94
After concluding that the City of Hialeah ordinances were not
neutral and of general applicability, the Court next. asked whether the
ordinances were justified by compelling state interests and were "nar-
rowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." 95 Although the Court
found the City proffered the legitimate governmental interests of pro-
tecting the public health and of preventing cruelty to animals, the
96 508 U.S. at 596; see Smith, 499 U.S. at 878-79.
87 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532.
88 Id. at 526-28,535-38.
89 See id. at 534-35.
9° Id. at 531-32.
gi Id. at 540 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,267-68
(1977)).
92 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540-42.
Id. at 535-36.
14 Id. at 540 (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 992 U.S. 256,279 (1979)).
98 Id. at 546.
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Court found that the City could address these concerns with "restric-
tions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial
practice. "96
C. Wisconsin v. Yoder: What Constitutes a Deep Religious Conviction?
Some laws, however, are not neutral on their face and explicitly
discriminate against a religious practice. 97
 In this situation, an indi-
vidual must prove that the law impairs the exercise of a central relig-
ious practice.98
 In Wisconsin v. Yoder; the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1972,
held that a Wisconsin law requiring compulsory high school atten-
dance for all children residing in the state violated the free exercise
rights of Amish parents. 99
 In coming to this determination, the Court
discussed what would be necessary to prove that a practice was central
to a religious belief."'
To find compulsory high school attendance unconstitutional as
applied to the Amish, the Court first determined whether the Amish
religious faith and their mode of life were, as the plaintiffs claimed,
"inseparable and interdependent."lin This is because "[a] way of life,
however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
a reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secu-
lar considerations:182
 Thus, for individuals to have the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause, they must prove that the religious practice
being infringed is "not merely a matter of personal preference, but
one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and
intimately related to daily living." 198
To satisfy the burden of proving that the Amish opposition to
compulsory high school education was rooted in religious belief, the
Amish parents presented expert witness scholars on religion and edu-
cation. 104
 The Court found that the Amish presented evidence that
"abundantly support[ed] the claim that the traditional way of life of
the Amish [was] not merely a matter of personal preference, but one
of deep religious conviction.”"8
 Moreover, the expert testimony re-
vealed that, to the Amish, "religion [was] not simply a matter of theo-
cratic belief .... [but] pervade[d] and determine[d] virtually their
" Id. at 538.
97 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
" See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept, 728 A.2d 127, 133 (Me. 1999).
99 406 U.S. at 234.
109 See id. at 215-19.
101
 Id. at 215.
102 Id.
103
 See id. at 216.
i 0' Yoder. 406 U.S. at 209.
10 Id. at 216.
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entire way of life." 106 Thus, the Yoder Court determined that enforce-
ment of Wisconsin's requirement of compulsory formal education
after the eighth grade would "gravely endanger, if not destroy," the
free exercise of the Amish religious beliefs.'°7
IV. FREE SPEECH AND SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAMS:
A REVIEW OF PRECEDENT
In addition to a free exercise challenge, school voucher programs
that exclude sectarian schools may also be vulnerable to a claim that
they violate the Free Speech Clause. 108 The Free Speech Clause pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of
speech." As mentioned above, although the U.S. Supreme Court
held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that a carefully tailored school
voucher program could include sectarian schools, the Court did not
answer the question of whether a state or municipality must include
sectarian schools in a school voucher program that provides aid to
public and non-sectarian private schools."° In attempting to predict
an answer to this question, two lines of U.S. Supreme Court free
speech jurisprudence must be reconciled." These two lines of cases
are commonly referred to as the "limited public forum" cases 112 and
the "government-as-speaker" cases.'"
A. Limited Public Forum Cases and Viewpoint Discrimination
A limited public forum is a place that the government could
close to speech, but that the government voluntarily and affirmatively
opens to speech.'" A limited public forum is created, for example,
when a school opens up its facilities for use by community groups)"
Once the government creates a limited public forum, it assumes an
obligation to justify its discriminations under applicable constitutional
"313 Id.
107 Id, at 219.
108 See infra notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
mg U.S. CONST. amend. I.
II° See 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
II' See infra notes 114-173 and accompanying text.
ns See infra notes 114-152 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 153-173 and accompanying text.
114 See ER WIN CIIEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1095 (2d
ed. 2002).
" 8 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel v. Gtr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-93 (1993); Bd. of Educ.
of the Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
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 Thus, if the government wants to exclude a group from use
of the limited public forum because of a religious affiliation, the ex-
clusions must be justified by a compelling state interest and must be
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.t 17
 Cases involving a limited public
forum, though not controlling, provide instruction for evaluating re-
strictions based on viewpoint in governmental subsidies." 8
In the first of a line of limited public forum cases, the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in Widmar v. Vincent, in 1981, held that a state university, -
once it chose to make its facilities available for meetings of registered
organizations on campus, could not discriminate against a group that
requested to use the facilities to engage in religious worship and in-
struction. 118
 The Court reasoned that "[t]hrough its policy of accom-
modating their meetings, the University created a forum generally
open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University as-
sumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions tin-
der applicable constitutional norms." Because the U.S. Constitution
"forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally
open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in
the first place," the university "must show that its [discrimination] was
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it was narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."
The Court agreed with the University's argument that its compli-
ance with the federal Establishment Clause was compelling. 122 The
Court concluded, however, that the Establishment Clause was not im-
plicated because "an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination
against religious speech, would have a secular purpose, and would
avoid entanglement with religion." Lastly, the Court found that
such a policy would not foster an excessive entanglement in religion
because it did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval on relig-
16 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-93; Aleigens,
496 U.S. at 252; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
117 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
118 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,544 (2001) (stating limited public
forum cases provide instruction for evaluating cases that involve government funding).
118
 See 454 U.S. at 277.
128 Id.
121 Id. at 267-68,270.
122
 Id. at 270-71.
122
 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72. The Court here applied the three-prong test an-
nounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which states that a policy will not offend the Establishment
Clause if the government policy has a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary
effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if the policy does not foster an
excessive government entanglement in religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971).
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ious sects or practices," and "the forum [was] available to a broad
class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers." 124
In dicta, however, the Widinar Court made observations that may
be helpful in determining whether the federal Constitution compels a
state to provide aid to sectarian elementary and secondary schools
once a state makes an affirmative decision to offer aid to students at-
tending non-sectarian private schools. 125 The first observation was that
unlike other religious group access-to-facilities cases, the respondent's
claims did not rest solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise
Clause. 126 The respondent's claim also implicated the First Amend-
ment rights of speech and association, and it was on the basis of
speech and association that the Court decided this case. 127 Thus, the
Court explicitly stated that it did not address whether the University
violated the respondent's free exercise rights. 128 Furthermore, the
Court stated that it did not reach the questions that. would arise if
state accommodation of free exercise and free speech rights
conflicted with the prohibitions of the Establishment. Clause. 129
In addition, the Court explicitly qualified its application of the
limited public forum policy by stating that the Court did not "ques-
tion the right of the University to make academic judgments as how
best to allocate scarce resources or to determine for itself on aca-
demic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it. shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.'" 13° This qualification left
significant discretion to the University to make curricular and admin-
istrative decisions. 131
Similarly, in Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1990, affirmed Congress's exten-
sion of the holding of Widmar to secondary school students. 132 In Met.-
gets, the issue was whether a secondary school could exclude recogni-
tion of a religious student group under the Equal Access Act. 133 The
124 Willmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
129 See id. at 273 n.13, 278.
129 See id. at 273 n.13.
122 See id.
129 See id.
129 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n.13,
1" Id. at 276 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in result)).
131 See id.
132 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253.
133 Id. at 231. The Equal Access Act extended the Court's decision in Widmar to secon-
dary schools, prohibiting secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance and
that maintain a limited open forum from denying equal access to students who wish to
meet within the forum based on the content of the speech at such meetings. See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 4071-4074 (2003). The limited open forum in Mergens was the ability for student clubs
and organizations to meet after school hours on school premises. See 496 U.S. at 231,
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Court was unpersuaded by the school's contention that "because the
student religious meetings [were] held under school aegis, and be-
cause the State's compulsory attendance laws [brought] the students
together (and thereby provide [d] a ready-made audience for student
evangelists), an objective observer in the position of a secondary
school student [would] perceive official school support for such relig-
ious meetings."'" The Court noted, however, that there was a "crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."'"
Certain observations in the Mergens opinion, however, assist in
determining whether a state can be compelled to include tuition aid
to religious schools once the state opens its school voucher "forum" to
include non-sectarian private schools in a voucher program." 6 First,
the Court noted that "the Act expressly limit[ed] participation by
school officials at meetings of student religious groups, and that any
such meetings had to be held during `noninstructional time.' 937
Thus, the Court found that the Act avoided the problems of student
"'emulation of teachers as role models'" and "'mandatory attendance
requirements."'" The Court also noted that "petitioners' fear of a
mistaken inference of endorsement [was] largely self-imposed, be-
cause the school itself has control over any impressions it gives its stu-
dents. 939
 Thus, the Court concluded that, "[t] o the extent a school
makes clear that its recognition of [the religious] club is not an en-
dorsement of the views of the club's participants, students will rea-
sonably understand that the school's official recognition of the club
evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, religious
speech."' 4°
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in 1993, reaffirmed the principle that once a
school has opened its facilities to the holding of civic and recreational
meetings of community groups, it cannot deny a religious group ac-
cess."' In Lamb's Chapel, a church group wanted to use the school
premises to show a film series dealing with family and child-rearing
issues from a Christian perspective.' 42
 The Court reasoned that be-
134 Mergers, 496 U.S. at 249-50.
135 Id. at 250.
136 Id, at 251: see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n.13, 278.
tsr Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 4071(6)) (citation omitted).
' 38 Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).
135 Id.
10
 Id. (citation omitted).
141 See 508 U.S. at 395.
142 See id. at 388-89.
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cause the school district had opened its property for such a wide vari-
ety of communicative purposes, restrictions on communicative uses of
the property were subject to constitutional limitation. 143 Furthermore,
the Court also reaffirmed that any exclusions must be justified by a
compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. 144
In another limited public forum case, Good News Club v. Milford
Central School District, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 2001, held that an
elementary school could not exclude a religious group from using
school facilities once it had opened its facilities for use by the com-
munity."5 The school district had decided to permit its residents to
use the school for educational, social, civic and recreational meetings,
entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the
community. 146 The Good News Club sought permission to hold its
weekly afterschool meetings in the school cafeteria, during which the
group proposed to sing songs, hear a Bible lesson, and memorize
scripture. 147 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, did not dispute
the parties' assessment that in opening school facilities for use by
community groups, the district created a limited public forum.' The
Court found that when a state establishes a limited public forum, the
state is "not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every
type of speech," but the state's restrictions must not discriminate "on
the basis of viewpoint."'"
Relying on its reasoning in Lamb's Chapel, the Court found that
the school district had permitted the use of its facilities for any group
that promoted the moral and character development of children, and
had excluded the Good News Club from similarly promoting this very
149 Sec id. at 391. In its next limited public forum case, Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1995, expressly relied on Widmar, Mer-
gers, and Lamb's Chapel to hold that denying funds to a religious student group was im-
permissible viewpoint discrimination. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-44 (1995). There, the University of Virginia refused to give funds
collected from the student activity fee to a religious group that published an expressly
religious magazine. See id. at 827. Although justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, ac-
knowledged that the student activity fee monies created a forum that was more metaphysi-
cal than spatial or geographic, the Court held that limited public forum principles were
applicable. See id. at 830. The Court concluded that denial of funds to the religious group
was unconstitutional because it discriminated based on the religious content of the speech
in the group's publication. See id. at 830-44.
144 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391.
145 Sec 533 U.S. at 111-12.
149 Id. at 102.
147 Id. at 103.
149 Id. at 106.
149 Id.
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objective from a religious perspective.'" The Court found no distinc-
tion between the activities of Lamb's Chapel and the actions of the
Good News Club, except that the former used films to convey its
Christian message, and the latter used songs and prayer.'" Thus, the
Court held that the school district could not discriminate between
groups attempting to serve the same permitted purpose based solely
on religion. 152
B. Government-as-Speaker Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has distinguished between the
government creating a limited public forum to encourage private
speech and the government using private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own programs. 153 Under the govern-
ment-as-speaker doctrine, when the government disburses public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, "it may
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is nei-
ther garbled nor distorted by the grantee."'" This is distinguished
from when the government does not itself speak, or subsidize trans-
mittal of a message it favors, but instead expends funds to encourage
a diversity of views from private speakers. 155 The Court has used this
government-as-speaker doctrine to draw a distinction between the
ability to exercise a constitutional right and the right to government
aid to exercise that right. 156
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in 1983, upheld an Internal Revenue Service regulation that prohib-
ited the use of tax-deductible contributions to support substantial
lobbying activities. 157 In enacting the legislation, "Congress chose not
to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other types
of activities that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the
' 5° Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-12.
161 Id. at 109-10.
152 id.
m See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (discussing the holding in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 199 (1991)).
134 Id. (discussing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194).
156
 See id. at 839.
166 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193; Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549
(1983); see also Harris v. McRae, 948 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding the subsidization of
family planning services that will lead to conception and childbirth and decline to pro-
mote or encourage abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (upholding a state
welfare regulation under which Medicaid recipients received payments for services related
to childbirth, but not for nontherapeutic abortions).
157
 461 U.S. at 543-94, 551. The Court noted that a tax exemption has much the same
effect as a cash grant to an organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its in-
come. See id. at 544.
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public welfare." 168 The Court noted that the issue was not whether the
nonprofit group must be permitted to lobby, but whether Congress
was required to provide it with public money to lobby. 169
Furthermore, the Court defended Congress's ability to choose to fund
the lobbying efforts of veterans' organizations and to choose not to
fund the lobbying efforts of other nonprofit grottps. 160 The Court said
this distinction was justified because of the compelling interest to
support veterans. 161 Thus, the Court implicitly held that the U.S.
Constitution confers no affirmative duty on the government to fund
protected activities. 162
In Rust v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1991, upheld a
federal law barring the use of Title X funds to counsel pregnant
women about abortion as a method of family planning. 162 In rejecting
the argument that such a prohibition was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, the Court stated that the government could, "without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with
the problem in another wa.y."164 The Court went on to find that in do-
ing so, the government did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,
but merely chose "to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other." 165 The Court reasoned that a — legislature's decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right."66 Moreover, "' [a] refusal to fund protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a "penalty" on that
activity."167 Thus, although the government cannot impose obstacles
to the exercise of a constitutional right, there is no affirmative duty
for the government to provide aid to exercise that right.'"
. In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, how-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1995, found that the University of
166 1d.
In Id. at 551.
160 Id. at 550-51.
lel Id.
162 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545, 551.
166 500 U.S. at 178.
164 Id. at 193; sec also Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (upholding subsidization of family plan-
ning services that will lead to conception and childbirth and that decline to promote or en-
courage abortion); Maher, 432 U.S. 464. 480 (upholding state welfare regulation under
which Medicaid recipients received payments for services related to childbirth, but not for
nontherapeu tic abortions).
165 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93.
160 Id. at 193 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 549)
Iv Id. (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19).
166 See id. at 201.
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Virginia violated the First Amendment when it declined to authorize
disbursements from its student activities fund to finance the printing
of a Christian newspaper. 169
 Although a wide variety of other student
groups were eligible for this type of reimbursement, religious groups
were excluded.'" Here, the University did not qualify for the govern-
ment-as-speaker exception because the University did not itself speak
or subsidize transmittal of a message it favored, but instead expended
funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. 171 Thus,
the Court was able to distinguish this discrimination from Rust, where
the government used private speakers to transmit specific information
about its own program,'" and Regan, where the government merely
gave preferential treatment to certain speakers, not to the content or
messages of those groups' speech. 173
V. THE MAINE TUITIONING PROGRAM: THE NEW FRONT LINE OF THE
SCHOOL VOUCHER DEBATE
When the Zelman u Simmans
-Harris opinion was announced, peo-
ple began to speculate that Maine's tuitioning program would be one
of the first challenged under the U.S. Supreme Court's new Estab-
lishment Clause holding. 174
 In response, the Maine Attorney General
issued a letter to the Maine Department of Education Commissioner
stating that Zdman did not address the particular issue presented by
Maine's law, and therefore the Maine tuitioning program should con-
tinue to exclude sectarian schools.'" Disagreeing with the Maine At-
torney General's opinion, the Institute for Justice announced the first
lawsuit against the Maine program, on behalf of six Maine families
who were denied aid to send their children to religious schools, on
169 515 U.S. at 837.
179 Sec id. at 824-25.
171 See id. at 834.
' 72 See id. at 833. In Legal Services Corp. v. 'Vazquez, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 2001, the Court provided further insight into the government-as-speaker exception
when it struck down several restrictions on the activities of lawyers receiving monies from
the Legal Services Corporation (the "LSC"). See 531 U.S. at 542, 549. The Court found
that, although the LSC program differed from the program at issue in Rosenberger in that its
purpose was not to "encourage a diversity of views," the "salient point" was that, like the
program in Rosenberger, the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to
promote a governmental message. See id. at 542.
'" See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
174 See, e.g., David Connerty-Martin, Experts: Supreme Court School Voucher Ruling Portends
Maine Changes, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 28, 2002, at A3.
175
 See Letter from Att'y Gen. G. Steven Rowe, to J. Duke Albanese, Comm'r, Me. Dep't
of Educ., http://www.state.medis/education/Press%2OReleases/vouchers/AGopinionvon-
cherhtm
 ( July 12, 2002).
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September 18, 2002. 176 A second lawsuit was filed in federal court by
the American Center for Law and Justice on behalf of several addi-
tional families in Maine on October 18, 2002. 177
A. A Brief History of the Maine Tuilioning Program
Maine, because of its large number of rural townships, has a pro-
gram called "tuitioning" which allows parents of children residing in
townships that do not have their own schools to send their children to
public or non-sectarian private schools outside the township. 179 Some
form of a tuitioning program has been in effect in Maine since
1873. 179
The origin of the tuitioning program in Maine can be traced to
two early characteristics of this rural state: first, Maine, along with the
rest of New England, had a tradition of placing responsibility for po-
litical affairs at the local levelm and, second, Maine's subscription to a
Protestant emphasis on education as a means of human develop-
ment."' These two factors compelled local townships, even before the
modern concept of public schools emerged, to establish small acade-
mies to educate local children. 192 These small private schools were
private only in the sense that the town contracted with the individual
schoolmaster to run a school where, due to rural location, a school
might not otherwise exist. 199 Furthermore, local townships did not
offer these schools as an alternative to state-funded schools, but rather
they were the only means of bringing a school to remote or rural ar-
175 See Media Advisory, Institute for Justice, Press Conference Announces Lawsuit Chal-
lenging Maine Law Barring Religious Options from Statewide School Choice Program,
http://www.ilorg/mecILVschool_choice/maine/9_17_02rna.shtml  (Sept. 17, 2002) [here-
inafter Media Advisory].
177 See Press Release, The Americans Center for Law and Justice, ACLJ Files Suit Against
Maine Dept. of Educ. for Discriminating Against Religious Schools by Denying Tuition
Payments, http://www.aclj.org/news/pressreleases/021018_maine_school.asp (Oct. 18,
2002) [hereinafter Press Release]. On August 8, 2003, a magistrate issued a Recommended
Decision on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, recommending that summary judg-
ment be granted in favor of the defendant school district. See Eulitt v. Me. Dep't of Educ.,
No. Civ. 02-162-B-W, 2003 WL 21909790 (D. Me. Aug. 8, 2003) (magistrate recommenda-
tion). The magistrate's recommendation is discussed infra, at notes 205, 215, and 226,
178 See Hammons, supra note 24, at 5; see also Frank Heller, Lessons from Maine, Education
Vouchers for Students Since 1873, in BRIEFING PAPERS No. 66 (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.),
Sept. 10, 2001, at 2.
179
	 supra note 24, at 5.
193 See id. at 6; see also DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM 54 (1988).
181 Hammons, 5Upra note 24, at 6; see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 302 ( J.P. Mayer ed., Harper Perennial: New York 2000) (1835).
182 Hammons, supra note 24, at 7.
133 Id.
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eas) 84
 Thus, the organizational structure of the Maine school system
was designed around the concept of local township control.' 85 This is
in contrast to most other states, where the organization of school sys-
tems developed at the county level.'"
In the nineteenth century, as Maine moved toward compulsory
education, many smaller towns found it less expensive to send stu-
dents to existing private academies rather than to build public
schools) 87 In 1873, Maine passed the Free High School Act, which
encouraged towns to offer free secondary education to its students,
rather than requiring payment as most private academies did.' 88 The
Free High School Act provided towns with three options, including
creating free high schools, making arrangements with a private acad-
emy to offer education for free, or paying tuition for students to at-
tend a private academy) 89 Many towns chose the third option.'"
For most of the 130 years the Maine tuitioning program has been
in effect, there was no prohibition against government tuitioning a
student to a sectarian school.'" This changed in 1981 when Maine
amended its tuitioning statute to exclude aid to sectarian schools.'"
This exclusion led to a set of legal challenges to the Maine tuitioning
program.'"
B. Bagley v. Raymond School Department: Challenging the Tuitioning
Program in Maine's Highest State Court
The first legal challenge to the amended Maine Rationing pro-
gram was decided in 1999 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
Bagley v. Raymond School Department. 04 In Bagley, five families from the
town of Raymond, which does not have a high school and instead
provides secondary education through Maine's Rationing program,
brought suit because they were denied tuition to send their sons to a
Catholic high school in Portland, Maine.'" The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine upheld the statute against challenges under the Free
184 Id.




 Hammons, supra note 24, at 7.
iga Id. at 8.
la° Id.
190 Id.
18 ' See id. at 9.
187 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204(3), (4) (West 2002).
193 See infra notes 194-223 and accompanying text.
184 See 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999).
195 Id. at 131.
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Exercise, Establishment, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Clauses
of the federal Constitution. 196
The families in Bagley first contended that the Maine "tuition
program violated the Free Exercise Clause by burdening their funda-
mental right to send their children to religious schools." 197 The court
noted that "' [t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has
placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious
belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental in-
terest justifies that burden.'" 98 The court thus found that the families
must "'initially demonstrate: (1) that the activity burdened by the
regulation is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; and (2)
that the challenged regulation restrains the free exercise of that reli-
gious belief.' " 199
In analyzing the first requirement, the court found that only one
of the five families in the suit had stated religion was a motivation for
sending their child to Catholic school. 2m Further, despite only limited
evidence in the record demonstrating that obtaining a Catholic edu-
cation for this family's son was central to their religious beliefs, the
court assumed the sufficiency of the evidence, and still could not find
that any substantial burden had been imposed on those beliefs.m The
court noted that it was well-established that there was no substantial
burden placed on an individual's free exercise of religion where a law
or policy merely operated to make the practice of the individual's re-
ligious beliefs more expensive. 202 Thus, [t]he fact that the govern-
ment cannot exact from a citizen a surrender of one iota of [her] re-
ligious scruples does not mean that [she] can demand of government
a sum of money, the better to exercise them.'"20
Continuing its free exercise inquiry, the court also noted that the
Maine statute did not prohibit the parents from sending their chil-
dren to the religious school of their choice. 204 Thus, the court deter-
mined, the statute made them "no more impaired in their efforts to
120 Id. at 147. Note that the statute was also challenged under the Maine Constitution,
but because neither party contended that the Maine Constitution affords greater protec-
tion than the federal Constitution, the court collapsed the challenges into one inquiry
under the federal Constitution. See id. at 132.
107 Id, at 133.
198 Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).
19° Bagley, 728 A.2d at 133 (quoting Blount v. Dep't of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551
A.2d 1377, 1379 (Me. 1988)).
2°° Id. at 134.
201 Id.
202 Id.
2" Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring))
(alterations retained).
204 See Bagley, 728 A.2d at 135.
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seek a religious education for their sons than parents of children in
Maine school districts that provide only a free nonreligious education
in public schools."205
The court next evaluated the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause
claim and similarly found it without merit. 206
 Although this case pre-
dates the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Zelman decision,207 the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine did note that the Establishment Clause
had "no role in requiring government assistance to make the practice
of religion more available or easier." 208
 Thus, the court found no sup-
port for the proposition that the Establishment Clause prevented a
state from refusing to fund religious schools 209
Lastly, the five Maine families raised an Equal Protection claim,
asserting that they were denied equal protection of the laws because
the school they chose was excluded from the program solely because
of its religious affiliation. 21 ° The court first implied that there was a
possible standing issue because the parents, in essence, claimed that
the excluded religious high school was treated differently because it
was a religious school, not that the parents were treated differently
because they were Catholic.'" The court, however, assumed arguendo
"that the parents' lack of opportunity to have the State pay the tuition
for their children to attend a private religious school resulted] in
their own disparate treatment on the basis of their religion."212
 Next,
the court applied strict scrutiny to the Maine statute, and stated that
the question it had to answer was "whether, having decided to create a
tuition program that allow[ed] parents to choose private schools,
[Maine could] exclude private religious schools from receipt of state
funds. "213
20 Id. The court here is referring to the fact that the Maine tuitioning program only
applies to families residing in school districts that do not operate their own public schools.
Note that the dissent, in its Equal Protection inquiry, implicitly objects to the majority's use
of all children in Maine as the denominator, and instead concludes the proper inquiry
focuses on all students residing in the same school district. See id. at 148 (Clifford,,., dis-
senting). The magistrate's recommendation in the current federal challenge to the Maine
tuitioning program, Eulitt v. Maine Department of Education, follows this same reasoning,
stating that the parents challenging the statute '`can point to no similarly situated parents
who have been granted [the entitlement to send their children to a religious school to
receive a religious education] by the Town of Minot or the State of Maine.* See 2003 WI,
21909790, at *4 n.4 (magistrate recommendation).
206
 See Bagky, 728 A.2d at 135.
2°7 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2°21 Bagky, 728 A.2d at 135-36.
192




2" Bagley, 728 A.2d at 137-38.
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The court then turned to the issue of whether the exclusion of
religious schools from the Maine tuitioning program served a compel-
ling state interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that end.214
The government stated that its only justification for the statute was
compliance with the Establishment Clause and the court found this
sufficiently compelling to uphold the statute. 215
214 See id. at 138. In determining that the Maine statute was narrowly tailored, the Bag-
ley majority merely stated that, "[w]ltile it may be possible for the Legislature to craft a
program that would allow parents greater flexibility in choosing private schools for their
children, the current program could not be easily tailored to include religious schools
without addressing significant problems of entanglement or the advancement of religion."
See id. at 147. The dissent in Bagley, however, reasoned that the complete and total exclusion of
religious schools was not necessary to accomplish the goal of the tuition program. See id. at
149 (Clifford, j., dissenting). Judge Clifford stated that tuition program with similar or
greater restrictions and conditions could be fashioned within the framework of the current
statute with very little effort on the part of the State. Tuition in less substantial amounts
could be authorized to benefit parents of children in religious schools. The tuition aid
could be directed through the parents to avoid restrictions on direct aid; and „ • the State
could adopt reasonable conditions and restrictions on the use of the State aid, insuring
that the moneys would not be used to directly subsidize the religious functions of the
schools, avoiding both direct aid of religion and excessive entanglement of the State in
religion." Id. at 150 (Clifford, j., dissenting).
21S Id. at 138. This simple concession may prove fatal for Maine in the two present
challenges to the tuitioning program. The court in Bagley went on to say that if the State's
justification is based on an erroneous understanding of the Establishment Clause, its
justification will not withstand any level of scrutiny. Sec id. at 138. Now, after Zelman, one
can argue that the State and the Bagley court did have an erroneous understanding of the
Establishment Clause. See supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
The magistrate in Eulitt, however, was not concerned with this concession, stating:
In any event, Streut [v. Albanese] does not determine the instant litigation be-
cause the State now advances several legitimate, alternative justifications for
precluding private sectarian schools from receiving public tuition dollars that
were not pressed in Strout.
(1) "A publicly funded education system works best when that education is
one of diversity and assimilation, and not a 'separate and sectarian' one."
(2) 'Public funds should pay for religiously neutral rather than a religious edu-
cation."
(3) The State cannot reasonably oversee all aspects of a sectarian school's
curriculum because to do so would result in religious entanglements.
(4) "Religious schools can, and reserve the right to, discriminate in favor of
those of their own religion, and this state should not fund discrimination."
(5) There exists no exigency such as in Zelman that would reasonably require
the State to depend upon sectarian schools to help provide all Maine chil-
dren with a free public education.
2003 WL 21909790, at *2-3 (magistrate recommendation).
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C. Strout v. Albanese: A Second Challenge to the Maine Tuitioning
Program in Federal Court
A second challenge to the Maine tuitioning program was decided
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1999 in Strout v.
Albanese.216
 A group of parents who were denied tu itioning funds for
use at sectarian schools brought suit in federal court. 217 The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decided that Maine was not constitutionally re-
quired to extend subsidies to sectarian schools under the Establish-
ment, Equal Protection, Free Exercise, Due Process, and Free Speech
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 218
In the Strout court's Establishment Clause analysis, it found that
there was "no relevant precedent for using [the Establishment
Clause's] negative prohibition as a basis for extending the right of a
religiously affiliated group to secure state subsidies."2" In its equal
protection analysis, the court cited Bagley, and concluded that "the
State's compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause viola-
tion require[d] that the State exclude sectarian schools from the tui-
tion program."22° The court further found that the Maine program
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the statute did not
prevent attendance at a religious school, and the parents failed to
prove that attendance at a religious school was a central tenet or prac-
tice of their faith. 221
 Lastly, the court rejected the families' due process
and free speech claims, because although the families had "a funda-
mental right to direct the upbringing and education of their children
. that fundamental right [did] not require the state to pay directly
for a sectarian education. "222 Thus, the court concluded that the
Maine tuitioning program was constitutional. 223
VI. ANALYSIS: Two NEW CHALLENGES TO THE MAINE TUITIONING
PROGRAM
Now, after Zelman v. Simmons-Haths, the Maine tu itioning pro-
gram is once again the focus of two new legal challenges,224 Maine
216 See 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
217 Id. at 59.
218
 Id. at 60-66.
219
 Id. at 64.
22° Id.
221 Strout, 178 F.3d at 65 (applying the free exercise test announced in Hernandez u
Commissioner, 990 U.S. at 699, which asks whether the government has placed a substantial
burden on the observation of a central belief or practice).
222 Id. at 66 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925)).
223 Id.
224 See Media Advisory, supra note 176; Press Release, supra note 177. There was also an
unsuccessful legislative challenge to the Maine tuitioning program after Zelman. See An Act
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presents a unique and ironic starting point for the first voucher pro-
gram challenges after Zelman. 225 Maine's program is unique because it
does not have any of the typical voucher program characteristics that
blur the line between policy and legality. 226 This is because Maine's
tuitioning program, unlike the most common voucher programs, was
not enacted to help low-income families escape failing public school
systems.227 Instead, the program is used simply to educate children
who reside in townships that do not have their own schools. 228 Thus,
voucher supporters cannot argue that the program enables low-
income families to have equal opportunity to choose the best educa-
tion for their children, nor can voucher opponents argue that the
program depletes the local public school of valuable resources. 229
Maine, as the focus of the first two post-Zelman challenges, is also
an ironic choice because Congressman Blaine, of the infamous Blaine
Amendments, was from Maine. 239 And, though voucher scholars con-
tend that the Blaine Amendments will pose a substantial barrier to
school voucher programs after Zelman, Maine is one of only three
states that have neither a Blaine Amendment nor a compelled sup-
port clause." Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
held that Maine's establishment clause was no more restrictive than
the federal Establishment Clause.232 Thus, whether the Maine tuition-
to Eliminate Discrimination Against Parents Who Want to Send Their Children to Relig-
ious Schools, L.D. 182 (H.P. 141), 121st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2003).
225 See infra notes 226-234 and accompanying text.
. 228 See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text. This unique characteristic of the
Maine tuitioning program is discussed in the magistrate's recommendation in Eulitt v.
Maine Department of Education. See No. Civ. 02-162-B-W, 2003 WL 21909790, at *3 (D. Me.
Aug. 8, 2003) (magistrate recommendation). There, the magistrate acknowledged the
Department of Education's justification that "Where exists no exigency such as in Zelman
that would reasonably require the State to depend upon sectarian schools to help provide
all Maine children with a free public education." See id. (magistrate recommendation).
Furthermore, the magistrate found support in the Zelman opinion itself, quoting the
Zelman majority: "' [a] ny objective observer familiar with the full history and context of the
Ohio program would reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist
poor children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.'"
Id. (magistrate recommendation) (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655
(2002)) (alteration retained).
227 See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
228 See Hammons, supra note 24, at 5; see also Heller, supra note 178.
22° See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
230 Sec supra note 42 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. That the exclusion of sectarian schools
from the Maine tuitioning program cannot be traced back to the anti-Catholic animus of
the Blaine Amendments weakens any Equal Protection challenge to the program. Cf.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1978) (law must reflect a racially discrimina-
tory purpose to violate Equal Protection Clause).
232 See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept, 728 A.2d 127, 132 (Me. 1999).
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ing program survives challenge will depend purely on federal consti-
tutional arguments.233
 As described above, these arguments may in-
clude challenges under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of
the federal Constitution. 234
A. Free Exercise Challenges to the Maine Tuitioning Program
In applying the U.S. Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence
to the Maine tuitioning program, it must first be noted that the Maine
statute is not neutral on its face because it explicitly excludes sectarian
schools.239
 Thus, any challenge to the program already satisfies the
threshold requirement of Employment Division v. Smith, which requires
a showing that the law is not neutral and is not of general applicabil-
ity. 236
 Though the neutrality element of a free exercise challenge is
already met, the Maine program will still survive a free exercise chal-
lenge because sending children to sectarian schools is not central to
any religious beliefs. 257 Furthermore, there is no requirement for a
state to make the exercise of religious beliefs less expensive.239
1. A Free Exercise Challenge to the Maine Tuitioning Program Will
Fail Because a Sectarian Education Is Not Central to the Catholic
Faith
A free exercise challenge to the exclusion of sectarian schools
from the Maine tuitioning program will fail because a sectarian edu-
cation is merely a matter of personal preference, not a belief of deep
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately
related to daily living. 239 As seen in the U.S. Supreme Court's discus-
sion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a way of life, however virtuous and admira-
ble, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation
of education if it is based on purely secular considerations—the
233
 See id.
234 See supra notes 74-173 and accompanying text. Many of the constitutional questions
presented by the Maine tuitioning program may be resolved next term when the U.S. Su-
preme Court hears Davey v. Locke on appeal from the Ninth Circuit. See 299 F.3d 748 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. May 19, 2003) (No. 02-1315). For a discus-
sion of the issues presented in Davey, see Derek D. Green, Does Free Exercise Mean Free State
Funding? In Davey v. Locke, The Ninth Circuit Undervalued Washington's lision of Religious
Liberty, 78 LVAsit. L. Rev. 653, 670-88 (2003).
238 See ME. ItEv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5204(3), (4) (West 2002); Bagley, 728 A.2d at 132
n .10.
238 See 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
237 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
238 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).
239 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
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claims must be rooted in religious belief. 240 Challengers to the Maine
program will have a difficult time producing expert testimony and
sufficient evidence to prove that a religious education is central to
their religious beliefs. 20 This is because most of the families challeng-
ing the Maine tuitioning program in the two current lawsuits send
their children to Catholic schools, and education in a Catholic school
is not a requirement of that religion. 242 AS contrasted with the Amish
in Yodet; a court should find that the choice of a Catholic education is
more a matter of personal preference than one of deep religious con-
viction.243
2. A Free Exercise Challenge to the Maine Tuitioning Program Will
Fail Because There Is No Fundamental Right at Issue
As noted in Bagley u. Raymond School Department, even if challeng-
ers to the Maine program are able to prove that a religious education
is central to their religious beliefs, the Maine tuitioning program still
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause because no fundamental
right has been infringed. 244 The Maine tuitioning program does not
require a child to attend a sectarian school, nor does the program
prohibit a family from choosing to have their child educated at a sec-
tarian school. 245 Instead, the program merely prevents parents who
reside in tuitioning districts from receiving money to send their child
to a sectarian schoo1.246 Moreover, as the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine stated in Bagley, "Mt is well established that there is no substan-
tial burden placed on an individual's free exercise of religion where a
law or policy merely operates so as to make the practice of [the indi-
vidual's] religious beliefs more expensive." 217 Thus, the Maine tuition-
ing program, even though it denies state funds for attendance at a
sectarian school, is still constitutional because it does not place a sub-
stantial burden on the free exercise of religion. 248
240 See id.
241 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
242 See Vindicating the Supreme Court: Fighting for Parental Liberty by Stopping Religious Dis-
crimination, INST. FOR JUST. ',MG. •ACKGROUNDER (Inst. for Justice, Washington, D.C.),
littp://www.ij.org/ntedia/school_choice/maine/background.shtml  (last visited Sept. 19,
2003); Press Release, supra note 177. A discussion of the tenets and integral religious prac-
tices of the Catholic faith is beyond the scope of this Note. Thus, this analysis relies on the
presumption that Catholicism does not require an individual to live in a church commu-
nity separate from world and worldly influence as does the Amish religion.
242 Sec 406 U.S. at 216.
244 See 728 A.2d at 134.
242 See id. at 135.
248 See id.
247 Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
248 See id. at 134-35.
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B. Free Speech: Applying the Limited Public Forum and Government-as-
Speaker Reasoning to the Maine Tuitioning Program
The Maine tuitioning program also does not violate the Free
Speech Clause because there is no affirmative duty for Maine to fund
religious schools merely because it chooses to fund private schools. 249
As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Rust v. Sullivan and Regan v. Taxa-
tion With Representation, the denial of aid cannot be deemed a burden
on the exercise of a fundamental right.. 250
1. The Maine Tuitioning Program Compared with Rust and Regan:
There Is No Affirmative Duty for Maine to Fund Sectarian Schools
The Maine tuitioning program is analogous to the Internal
Revenue Service regulation upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Re-
gan because, in both cases, the U.S. Constitution confers no
affirmative duty on the government to fund the protected activities at
issue.251
 In Regan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the government
was free not to subsidize lobbying, a right protected by the First
Amendment, as extensively as it chose to subsidize other types of ac-
tivities that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public
welfare.252
 This was a constitutional choice by the government because
the issue was not whether the nonprofit group must be permitted to
lobby, but whether the government was required to provide it with
public money to lobby.255
 Similarly, Maine can choose not to fund at-
tendance at sectarian schools, even though it chooses to fund atten-
dance at non-sectarian schools. 254 As in Regan, the issue here is not
whether parents must be permitted to send their children to sectarian
schools, but whether Maine is required to provide the parents with
public money for tuition at sectarian schools. 255
 A court should there-
fore find, as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Regan, that the denial of
funds to exercise a fundamental right is not an infringement on that
right. 256
The exclusion of sectarian schools from the Maine tuitioning
program is also analogous to the federal law upheld in Rust.257 There,
243 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
2513 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178; Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.
251 See 461 U.S. at 549.
252 See id. at 550.
253 See id. at 551.
254 See id. at 550-51.
255 See id.
236 Sec 461 U.S. at 549.
257 See generally 500 U.S. 173.
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the U.S. Supreme Court held constitutional a law that barred the use
of Title X funds to counsel pregnant women about abortion as a
method of family planning. 258 The Court reasoned that a legislature's
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe on that right. 259 The Court also noted that "` [al refusal to
fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the im-
position of a "penalty" on that activity., "260
Under the Rust Court's reasoning, Maine is free to choose not to
subsidize a parent's choice to send his or her child to a sectarian
school merely because it subsidizes the alternative of public or non-
sectarian private schools. 261 The denial of tuitioning funds for use at
sectarian schools is merely a refusal on the part of the government to
fund a protected activity. 262 Without more, this cannot be equated
with the imposition of a penalty on that right. 263 Therefore, the court
should conclude here, as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Rust, that
there is no affirmative duty for Maine to provide aid for a parent
choosing to send his or her child to a sectarian schoo1. 264
2. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's Limited Public Fortun
Reasoning to the Maine Tuitioning Program
The exclusion of sectarian schools from Maine's tuitioning pro-
gram does not implicate the U.S. Supreme Court's limited public fo-
rum reasoning. 265 One may attempt to argue that a school voucher
program that permits aid to public and non-sectarian private schools
but excludes religious schools from participation could be interpreted
as a form of viewpoint discrimination. 266 •
236 See id. at 177-78.
2" See id. at 193; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding the sub-
sidization of family planning services that will lead to conception and childbirth and that
decline to promote or encourage abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (up-
holding a state welfare regulation under which Medicaid recipients received payments for
services related to childbirth, but not for nontherapeutic abortions).




264 See id. at 201.
263 See supra notes 114-152 and accompanying text.
"a See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-93 (1993); lid. of Educ.
of the Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
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a. The Case for Requiring Maine to Include Sedation Schools in Its Tuition-
ing Program Under Limited Public Forum Reasoning
Although in the school voucher context, the viewpoint discrimi-
nation is based on selective funding, not the use of facilities, cases in-
volving a limited forum provide instruction for evaluating restrictions
based on viewpoint in government subsidies. 267 By analogy to the con-
stitutional restraints placed on the use of a limited public forum, even
though a state or municipality is not required to offer private choices
in fulfilling its obligation to provide public education to all children
residing within its borders, when it does offer such a choice, it creates
a type of limited public forum 266 Therefore, the argument is that any
restriction in such a program that prohibits use of this government
aid for religiously affiliated schools resembles a restriction on the use
of a limited public forum based on religious speech. 269
A challenge to the exclusion of sectarian schools in the Maine
program will likely rely on Widmar v. Vincent to require that this fa-
cially discriminatory program be necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 2" Although the
U.S. Supreme Court in Widmar stated that compliance with the Estab-
lishment Clause was deemed to be compelling, 271
 one might claim
that the exclusion of sectarian schools from the Maine tuitioning pro-
gram is no longer required after Zelman, so such compliance can no
longer be considered a compelling state interest. 272 This position is
strengthened by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine's decision in
Bagley, where Maine did not dispute that its only justification for ex-
cluding religious schools from the tuition program was compliance
with the Establishment Clause. 279
b. Why the Limited Public Forum Argument Fails as Applied to the Maine
Tuitioning Progra in
This reliance on the limited public forum doctrine and the
Zelman opinion, however, is misplaced. 274 First, Maine is correct to de-
termine that, even after Zelman, .including sectarian schools in its tui-
267 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,544 (2001).
266 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-93; Mer-
gene, 496 U.S. at 252; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
260 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-93; Men
gene, 496 U.S. at 252; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
27° Sce454 U.S. at 267-68,270.
271
 See id. at 271.
272 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
273 See 728 A.2d at 138.
274 See supra notes 267-273 and accompanying text.
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dolling program would violate the Establishment Clause. 275 This is
because the Zelman majority's approval only extends to programs in
which aid reaches schools as a result of the independent choices of
private individuals, as opposed to programs that provide aid directly
to the schools. 276 The latter would be direct, unrestricted aid which
could be used for religious purposes. 277 Under Maine's program, the
public aid goes directly to the school. 278 Thus, the inclusion of sectar-
ian schools in the Maine tuitioning program would still violate the
Establishment Clause, even after Zelman.. 279
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has been careful to limit its
limited public forum reasoning to situations in which the government
does not itself speak.28* In Widmar, the Court explicitly qualified its
application of the limited public forum doctrine by stating that it did
not "question the right of the University to make academic judgments
as to how best to allocate scarce resources or `to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study."281 Thus, it is constitu-
tionally permissible for Maine to decide not to include sectarian
schools in fulfilling its obligation to educate its youth. 282
Similarly, in Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that there was a crucial differ-
ence between government speech endorsing religion, which the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. 283 Again, Maine
here is merely enlisting non-sectarian private schools to help provide
free education. 284
CONCLUSION
The exclusion of sectarian schools from the Maine tuitioning
program is constitutional, even after the recent decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons -Harris. The Zelman decision
merely held that a state could carefully tailor a school voucher pro-
gram to include sectarian schools without violating the Establishment
275 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
278 See hi. at 662-63.
277 See id.
278 See Me. REV. STA•. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5810(2) (West 2002).
279 Sec 536 U.S. at 662-63.
289 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
281 454 U.S. at 276 (quoting Sweet)? v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
282 See id.
283 See 496 U.S. at 250.
284 See id.
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Clause. It did not say that states must include sectarian schools in tui-
tioning programs that include non-sectarian private schools.
The Maine tuitioning program does not meet the criteria out-
lined by the Zeiman Court and, therefore, inclusion of sectarian
schools in the program would violate the Establishment Clause. In
addition, the Maine program does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause because there is no fundamental right to public funding to
attend a sectarian school. Lastly, Maine did not create a limited public
forum by including non-sectarian private schools in its tuitioning pro-
gram because the State was merely enlisting private schools to help
fulfill its statutory duty to educate its children. Thus, the exclusion of
sectarian schools from the Maine tuitioning program is constitutional.
RrIA-ANNE O'NEILL
